Inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) as Alienation (Entfremdung)? A Critical Heidegger Through Marcuse

Abstract

From 1928 to 1933, Herbert Marcuse undertook a dialogue between Marxist theory and Heideggerian phenomenology, which he called Dialectical Phenomenology. In this context, he suggested the possible equivalence between the Marxist category of alienation (Entfremdung) and the notion of inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) proposed by Heidegger in Being and time; along with this, a critical and revolutionary praxis was equivalent to authenticity (Eigentlichkeit). However, Marcuse did not get to delve into the arguments and implications that could be derived from such equivalence, since the project of a Dialectical Phenomenology was abandoned in 1933. In this context, the present study seeks to assess whether such equivalence is sustainable, thus as well as the philosophical consequences that this would imply. The resulting thesis is not one-dimensional, it maintains, rather, that authenticity would imply a revolutionary praxis, but there is no equivalence on the opposite side, that is, inauthenticity does not necessarily equal alienation, although the foundation of that (what Heidegger called Enteignis) can be considered as the ontological basis of alienation.