Welfare Regimes in Latin America: A Retrospective
Comparative Analysis
Regímenes de Bienestar en América Latina: Un análisis
comparativo retrospectivo
Bruno Miguel Gonçalves Bernardes
European University (Universidade Europeia) and Observatório Político. Portugal.
bruno.bernardes@universidadeeuropeia.pt
ABSTRACT
In this article we begin a retrospective study of the redistributive policies that were put into practice in
Latin America between the 1990s and 2010s, namely in the periods between 1990-95 and 2010-15, taking
into account the political factors of that context. Actors, institutions and political arrangements that were
devised in the literature as modifiers of the development scheme must be analyzed retrospectively, with
regard to their contribution to the consolidation of different trajectories of welfare regimes.
Problematizing what happened in this period becomes essential to understand the impact of the rupture
and the scope of the continuity of the development process in eight different welfare regimes: Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Keywords: Welfare regimes, Latin America, institutional trajectories.
RESUMEN
En este artículo comenzamos un estudio retrospectivo de las políticas redistributivas que se
implementaron en América Latina entre las décadas de 1990 y 2010, específicamente en los períodos
comprendidos entre 1990-95 y 2010-15, teniendo en cuenta los factores políticos de ese contexto. Los
actores, instituciones y arreglos políticos concebidos en la literatura como modificadores del esquema de
desarrollo deben ser analizados retrospectivamente, en relación con su contribución a la consolidación de
diferentes trayectorias de regímenes de bienestar. Problematizar lo ocurrido en este período resulta
esencial para comprender el impacto de la ruptura y el alcance de la continuidad del proceso de desarrollo
en seis regímenes de bienestar diferentes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, México, Uruguay y
Venezuela.
Palabras clave: Regímenes de bienestar, América Latina, Trayectorias institucionales.
Cita en APA 7: Gonçalves Bernardes, B. (2024). Regímenes de bienestar en América Latina: un análisis
comparativo retrospectivo. Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales – Relacis, V.3 (1).
Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales |
Vol. III, núm. I, pp. 95 - 120
Introduction
Latin American Regimes
Welfare states are an institutional force, established by principles that vary according to
ideal types, or regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Pierson, 2000). These regimes provide a
theoretical basis for interpreting the complex historical and political process of social
development strategies.
In the case of Latin America, the concept of social welfare regime has been identified as
a set of policies and strategies undertaken by the dynamic between State, Market and Family
(Arts & Gelissen, 2012; Barrientos, 2004, 2009; Huber & Bogliaccini, 2012; Filgueira, 1998, 2005;
Fleury, 1999; Franzoni, 2007; Gough, 2004, 2013; Munck, 2013; Draibe and Riesco, 2007;
Segura-Ubiergo, 2007). The first studies conducted by Mesa-Lago (1978, 1994) and Filgueira
(1995, 2008) classify welfare schemes according to historical aspects, with the former defining
them as (1) pioneers, with almost universal social protection coverage, (2) intermediate,
characterized either by stratification in coverage and access to services, or by greater coverage of
an almost universal nature, and (3) late, with a small percentage of the population covered and a
limited number of social services. For his part, Filgueira (1998, 2005) adapts Esping-Andersen's
theses to Latin America, understanding regimes in three distinct historical phases: liberal
(1920-1950), developmentalism (1950-1970) and the Washington Consensus, defining three
regimes: universal-stratified with extensive but stratified social protection; exclusionary
comprising states with little capacity to intervene and few resources; and dual, which combine
stratified and exclusionary social welfare types.
At a second level of analysis, Franzoni (2007), Gough (2004, 2013), Segura-Ubiergo
(2007) or Draîbe and Riesco (2007) generically classify regimes from the point of view of the
weight of the state, the market or families and the dynamic institutional relationship between
them. In this sense, they vary in terms of protectionism - with a greater focus on public policies
centered on the state and decommodification -, productivism - where policies protect certain
sectors of activity or where there is an intermediate degree of commodification -, familiar -
where social coverage is minimal or non-existent - and, finally, mixed, i.e. where different degrees
of protectionism and productivism coexist.
As Barrientos (2004, 2009) points out, the 1980s and 1990s changed Latin American
regimes, which saw a clear deterioration in state services, along with the stratification of labor
protection, an increase in informality, and the success of the economy's international insertion.
Along with these elements, the 2000s and 2010s presented themselves as an opportunity that is
important to revisit, particularly with regard to the effects of political-institutional factors in
shaping new dynamics in social welfare regimes.
Data analysis
The liberalization/privatization process of Latin American welfare regimes presents a
different spectrum between cases, particularly between those that would follow a more orthodox
model, compared to others that are more moderate (Abel & Lewis, 2002; Barrientos, 2004). In
regimes where privatization has reached high levels, including replacing the old protection and
health systems, nationalization reforms have become more difficult, since the costs of change are
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higher for the power structure that benefits certain political and social actors. However, even in
cases where the liberalization process was more moderate, limitations arise in the transformation
of welfare regimes due to pressure from the most privileged groups and sectors (Abel & Lewis,
2002; Cortés, 2008; Pribble, 2011, 2013a, 2013b). By the early 2000s, a transformation of the
political landscape in Latin America had become evident (Malamud, 2009; Munck, 2008; Munck,
2009; Patrício, 2012).
In this milieu, comparative qualitative analysis (QCA) makes it possible to assess possible
pathways through multi-causal analysis in two different set of data (1990-1995/2010-2015)
(Amenta & Hicks, 2008; Ragin, 2008). The main step in its application is to construct points by
association, case by case, for each index. As the annex table shows, these indices are constructed
using standardised indicators (z-scores) (Katz et al., 2005).
Table 1.
Index and indicators
97
Index
Indicators
Source(s)
Institutionalized
Public Welfare
(IPW)
Public spending by functions, in
percentages of GDP (central
government)
ECLAC
Proportion of persons above
retirement age receiving a pension
ILO, Rudra (2007)
Pupils starting grade 1 and
reaching the last grade of primary
school (%)
ECLAC
Hospital beds (per 10 000
population)
WHO, Rudra (2007)
Liberal Spectrum
(LS)
Private social security systems
De la Torre & Rudolph (2018), Filgueira
(1998, 2005), Mesa-Lago (2012), Kritzer
(2000), Rofman (2005)
Private expenditure on health as a
percentage of total expenditure on
health
ECLAC, WHO
Private schools enrollment
ECLAC
Economic liberalisation
The Heritage Foundation
Vulnerability Matrix
Index
(VMI)
Poor and extreme poor (% of
population)
ECLAC
Informal sector as a percentagem of
total workforce
ECLAC
Vulnerable population in the labor
market (%)
ECLAC; ILO
Political
Fragmentation
(FRAG)
Constitutional structure
Lijphart (1984), Huber, Ragin & Stephens
(1993), Cheibub, Elkins & Ginsburg (2011)
Party system fragmentation
Gallagher & Mitchell (2005); electoral data
Institutional Left
(LFT)
Left in government (%)
Electoral data
Left in parliament (%)
Electoral data
Union density
ILO
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As shown in table 1, points by association take into account five index each formulated
by several indicators explored in the literature. Taking into account the dynamic relationship
between the state, the market and the family, we analyze the effort of public policies through the
index of "institutionalised public welfare" (IPW), which is the result of four indicators: the
aggregate of public expenditure (AggPE), an indicator of generational stratification (Pensions)
and two indicators of performance in the education (Edu) and health sectors (Hth).
IPW = AggPE + Pens + Edu + Hth
4
The Liberal Spectrum index (LS) is the result of an evaluation of the historical
liberalisation that took place between the 1970s and 1990s in Latin American welfare systems
measured by privatisation indicators (Abel and Lewis, 2002; Avelino et al., 2005; Barrientos,
2004; Ffrench-Davis, 2005; Filgueira, 1998, 2005; Franzoni, 2007, 2009). There is also a measure
of social security systems (PrivSS). Health and education indicators are also included, as well as
an indicator of the economy’s openness (EO).
LS = PrivSS + PrivHth + PrivEduc + EO
4
As ECLAC has emphasised with regard to population gaps and vulnerabilities (Barros et
al., 2009), the vulnerability matrix index (VMI) is measured on the basis of a poverty indicator
and two employment indicators.
VMI = Pov + InfW + WV
3
Alongside federalism, electoral systems, presidentialism and the interaction between the
latter and the legislature also have a significant impact on policymaking (Kitschelt et al, 2010;
Patrício, 2012; Pribble, 2013a). Constitutional structure is a measure that allows us to consider
opportunities and constraints for parties in pursuing policies (Lijphart, 1984; Cheibub, Elkins
and Ginsburg, 2011; Huber, Ragin and Stephens, 1993; Huber and Stephens, 2001). In parallel,
we take into account party fragmentation as a measure of competition (Bartolini and Mair, 1990;
Mair, 1990; Kitschelt et al., 2010).
FRAG = Const + PartFrag
2
In the case of the left, from the perspective of mobilisation, but especially systemic
institutionalisation (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Powell, 2009; Nilsson, 2011), we consider its weight
in the formation of government coalitions, its election to the lower house (Murillo, 2001; Strom
and Nyblade, 2009) and union density.
LFT = LftGov + LftParl + UDens
3
For the first set of data (1990-1995), Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay have been
referred to as pioneering countries in the institutionalisation of social policies (Mesa-Lago, 1994).
However, Filgueira (1998, 2005) clarifies that both social spending and the criteria for investment
in welfare policies differentiate Argentina, Chile and Uruguay (state-stratified) from the Brazilian
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and Mexican cases. However, taking into account the education, health and social protection
sectors, Filgueira (1998, 2005) considers that the Brazilian case is closer to the state-stratified
regime, namely in public spending, social protection and health.
For the liberalisation index, Chile, Argentina and Colombia have high values; Argentina
and Uruguay had not completely privatised their social security systems (Mesa-Lago, 2012);
Mexico and Uruguay also show identical results in terms of health privatisation and economic
openness; the differences between Bolivia and Venezuela are accentuated by the highly privatized
social security systems.
The Bolivian case is the most vulnerable, both in terms of access to and the structure of
the labour market, and in terms of poverty. Colombia differs from the former in the structure of
the labour market. Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela have average vulnerability values. In the case of
the political fragmentation index, Brazil stands out with the highest value. Argentina and
Venezuela are classified here as cases of medium fragmentation.
Table 2.
Degrees of membership, by case and index (1990-1995)
Institutionalized Public Welfare (IPW)
Cases
Score
Uruguay, Argentina
Highest
1
Brazil, Chile
High
0.8
Mexico
Average
0.6
Venezuela
Low
0.4
Bolivia, Colombia
Lowest
0.2
Liberal Spectrum (LS)
Cases
Score
Chile
Highest
1
Argentina, Colombia, Mexico,
Uruguay, Venezuela
High
0.8
Bolivia, Brazil
Average
0.6
Vulnerability Matrix Index (VMI)
Cases
Score
Bolivia
Highest
1
Colombia
High
0.8
Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela
Average
0.6
Chile, Uruguay
Low
0.4
Argentina
Lowest
0.2
Political Fragmentation (FRAG)
Cases
Caraterísticas
Score
Brazil
Highest
1
Argentina, Venezuela
Average
0.6
Bolivia, Mexico
Low
0.4
Uruguay
Very low
0.2
Chile, Colombia
Lowest
0
Institutionalized Left (LFT)
Cases
Caraterísticas
Score
Chile
Average
0.6
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
Venezuela
Low
0.4
Uruguay
Very low
0.2
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Bolivia, Colombia
Lowest
0
In the second set of data (2010-2015), Argentina has the highest IPW values, followed by
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay (Table 3). Once again, these four pioneering countries continue to
have the highest public spending on average (Mesa-Lago, 1994). Bolivia, Mexico and Venezuela
follow with average institutionalization. Bolivia is the case with the highest growth in all
indicators.
In terms of the institutionalization of private systems, Chile continues to be the
paradigmatic example. Mexico has maintained the weight of private healthcare and has seen a
slight increase in the indicators for private education and economic openness; the same is true of
Colombia. Bolivia has also maintained part of its private social security systems, along with a very
significant increase in private education. Still with a medium-high level of liberal
institutionalization is Brazil, which is consolidating the role of private health and education
systems. The Venezuelan case continues to show a high proportion of private healthcare, while
maintaining the format of social security systems. Finally, the Uruguayan and Argentinian cases
show a considerable decline in the private health sector.
The VMI index shows a significant increase in informal labour. Bolivia, Colombia,
Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina register significant increases. In the poverty indicator, Mexico
shows a significant increase, while the other cases show significant decreases. The Venezuelan
case maintains its vulnerability structure, while the Brazilian case is closer to Argentina.
Brazil and Argentina maintain a high degree of political fragmentation. The Colombian
case shows greater political fragmentation as a result of the end of the former electoral
monopoly. The Bolivian case, on the other hand, has more diffuse constitutional fragmentation
due to the inclusion of new constitutional mechanisms.
The Bolivian, Uruguayan and Venezuelan cases also show an exponential increase in the
presence of the left in government and the legislature compared to the 1990s. The Argentinian
and Chilean cases show a consolidation of the left in government and parliament.
Table 3.
Degrees of membership, by case and index (2010-2015)
Institutionalized Public Welfare (IPW)
Cases
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay
Highest
Mexico
High
Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela
Average
Liberal Spectrum (LS)
Cases
Chile
Highest
Mexico
High
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia
Above average
Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela
Average
Vulnerability Matrix Index (VMI)
Cases
Bolivia
Highest
Colombia
High
Mexico, Venezuela
Above average
Argentina, Brazil
Average
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Chile, Uruguay
Low
Political Fragmentation (FRAG)
Cases
Brazil
Highest
Argentina
High
Colombia
Average
Bolivia, Chile, Mexico
Low
Uruguay, Venezuela
Lowest
Institutionalized Left (LFT)
Cases
Bolivia
Highly
Uruguay, Venezuela
High
Argentina, Chile
Above average
Brazil
Low
Colombia, Mexico
Lowest
Cases
Taking into account the main objectives, it is to be expected that liberalisation factors, in
conjunction with vulnerabilities in the labour market and access to income, will become
necessary and sufficient factors for the lower degree of institutionalized public welfare. The
FRAG and LFT indices, on the other hand, will only be more relevant in the second set of data.
The factors ‘fragmentation’ and ‘institutional left’ are both sufficient for the institutionalization
of public welfare.
The liberalisation factor is usually necessary and sufficient in cases with a higher IPW,
making it a viable explanation. Even in cases with a lower degree of liberalisation, the LS factor is
consolidated as a constant of the public welfare development model (Barrientos, 2005, 2009).
In a parsimonious solution (LS*~LFT), the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
express the importance of the process of privatization of welfare services combined with the
lesser presence of the institutional left. According to Filguera (2005) and Barrientos (2009),
Mexico expresses the importance of the liberal spectrum through the deep privatization reforms
of social security systems and the multiplication of welfare forms to combat poverty. Finally,
Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela are cases of low public investment in social welfare.
Table 4.
Consistency 2010-2015
Configuração
Consistency
Cases
LS*VMI*+
LS*~FRAG*LFT
0.96
ARG, BOL, BRA, COL, MEX,
VEN
1
BOL, CHL, URU, VEN
Fonte: FSQCA 3.0.
In this respect, we can see the continued importance of the LS indicator, which is highly
present in all cases, in parallel with the vulnerability indicator. For this set of data, the necessity
test for the IPW result with the LS and FRAG indicators achieves satisfactory consistency (0.91).
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Table 5.
Outcome, 1990-95
Configuração
Cases
LS*~VMI*~FRAG
CHL, URU
LS*FRAG*~LFT
ARG, BRA, VEN
LS*VMI*~LFT
MEX
~IPW= LS*VMI*~LFT
BOL, COL
Source: FSQCA 3.0.
Contrary to the results from the first half of the 1990s, the trajectories clearly group the
cases, where the lower presence of VMI dictates a higher presence of IPW. The LS variable also
maintains a high consistency (0.83), and it is likely that the historical institutionalist argument of
the dependent trajectory can be applied in determining the public institutionalization of welfare.
Table 6.
Outcome, 2010-2015
Configuration
Cases
LS*VMI*FRAG(*LFT)
ARG, BRA
LS*VMI*~LFT
COL, MEX
LS*~VMI*LFT*~FRAG
CHL, URU
LS*VMI*LFT(*~FRAG)
BOL, VEN
Source: FSQCA 3.0.
CHILE AND URUGUAY: BETWEEN PARADIGMS
Within the ‘liberal regime’ classification, Chile represents an institutional framework that
has allowed the legacy of policies initiated by the military dictatorship to continue (Pribble,
2013b). During the coalition governments, there was an increase in investment through social
programmes and policies, in line with the privatization process. In the second half of the 1990s,
the Concertación saw a split between those who favored a more productivism approach and those
who preferred a more protectionist approach (Pribble, 2013a). However, fear of a return to
uncontrolled public accounts and the strong presence of technocracy proved to be important
factors (Pribble, 2013). Even with the internal divisions caused by the ideological differences
between the ruling coalitions and parliamentarians, there is a greater weight of the legacy of
policies, i.e. greater costs in changing the institutional framework of public welfare.
In Uruguay, the Frente Amplio (FA) won the 2004 presidential elections. The rise of this
common left-wing front was accompanied by a continuous improvement in the country's
socio-economic conditions. In Chile, Bachelet's first government approved reforms to the
pension system, now centered on the profits generated by the copper industry, measures initiated
by the previous President Lagos and which made it possible to increase coverage and benefits
(Pribble, 2013). However, due to the increase in coverage, Bachelet and the statist wing of the
Concertación would face renewed concerns about the increase in spending and the difficulties of
universalizing the system (Pribble, 2013). Also, in the field of combating poverty, Presidents
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Aylwin and Frei would introduce various income transfer programmes, without them achieving
coverage as significant as the Lagos government's Chile Solidario (Pribble, 2013b).
In health, Chile continued to have a dual system with only a small proportion of the
population able to access private services (Pribble, 2013b). The public sector, which in the early
2000s took care of more than 70 per cent of beneficiaries, remained underinvested, while the
private sector became a strong political player (Pribble, 2013b). Despite the 2004 reform that
established the Plan de Acceso Universal a Garantías Explícitas, private investment in health
remained at around 40 per cent. Despite these changes in the social protection and health
systems, it is clear that not only is the productivism character maintained through the addition to
the international and labour markets, but also the political obstacles imposed by the fear of
controlling public debt. Once again, the productivism nature of the Chilean welfare system was
maintained despite the governance of the more statist sectors of the Concertación.
Since the 1990s, governments in Uruguay have broadened the spectrum of family
support and protection. In 1995, an increase in the family allowance was approved and in 1999 a
non-contributory version of this benefit was established (Vigorito, 2006). Still under the
presidency of Colorado Battle, Uruguay continued to universalize this support (Pribble, 2013).
The universalization of child benefit was greatly boosted by electoral competition between the
traditional parties and the gradual rise of the FA (Pribble, 2013a).
In health, Uruguay presents a different scenario, especially as the military dictatorship
continued with public investment (Castiglioni, 2005). However, it remained very unequal with
problems of financial sustainability in the private sector between the 1990s and the early 2000s
(Pribble, 2013a). With the financial and social crisis, demand for the public sector increased,
reaching more than half of the population in 2006. More radical changes in the sector were also
held back by the division of the private sector, which was less corporatist and politically
dominant than in Chile (Pribble, 2013). It wasn't until the FA governments that the Servicio
Nacional Integrado de Salud was established, with changes in access, funding and increased
coverage.
Table 7.
Party fragmentation, electoral volatility and majorities: Chile and Uruguay (1990-2015)
Fragmentation
Volatility
Senate
majority
Lower house
majority
Chile (1990-95)
1.99
10
1989 - No
1993 - No
1989 - Yes
1993 - Yes
Chile (2010-15)
2.13
13.9 (2009)
2009 - No
2013 - Yes
2009 - No
2013 - Yes
Uruguay (1990-95)
3.33
11.9
1989 - No
1994 - No
1989 - No
1994 - No
Uruguay (2010-15)
2.65
14.6 (2009)
2009 - Yes
2014 - No
2009 - Yes
2014 - Yes
Sources: Servicio Electoral de Chile e Corte Electoral (Uruguay); Roberts e Wibbels, 1999, Mainwaring, España
e Gervasoni (2009), Concha (2014).
In the cases of Chile and Uruguay, the reversal and reaction to the liberal character of
their welfare regimes suggests different degrees. While in Chile the institutional reversal is clearly
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more complex, with a greater weight of the legacy of policies. While the Concertación represented a
quasi-programmatic continuity in the management of public debt, in other words, the costs of
institutional change becoming higher; in Uruguay, the degree of continuity also shows some signs
of reaction in the party-political field, with the more statist legacy of its welfare regime
maintaining its distinctive mark, the result of lower informality and the proportion of poor
people and the maintenance of certain electoral cleavages inherited from the traditional
hegemonic bipolar dispute. However, the financial and social crisis had a defining impact on
health and protection policies, projecting a moderate institutional reaction within the structure of
the welfare system during the Vasquez and Mujica governments. In both cases, the lesser
presence of political-institutional fragmentation proved to play a decisive role in the continuity of
policies and the institutional framework of welfare regimes, unlike the institutional left, which
had a more moderate effect.
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL: THE PROTECTIONIST TURN
The 2001 financial crisis greatly affected Argentina's social fabric (Munck, 2008). At the
same time, since the 1990s, the Peronist movement and the Justicialist Party had been facing a
series of divisions caused by the neoliberal public policies of then President Menem (Levitsky,
2003; Pribble, 2013a). The Justicialist Party has always been concerned with building a mass base
allied to a mix of trade union organizations and representatives from different sectors of society.
While Menem (1989-1999) embraced the liberalisation context, the Kirchner governments
(2003-2007/2007-2015) were later protectionist. This flexibility is also explained by the party's
organizational evolution, which Pribble (2013b) considers to be the result of a clientelist
mechanism.
In 2003, the Duhalde government (2002-2003) established the Jefes y Jefas program to
protect elderly people over the age of 70 who were not covered by the pension system. However,
this plan only multiplied the stratified nature of the complex pension system, with a
particularistic vision of protecting certain sectors (Bertranou and Grushka 2002). Paradoxically,
but from a political point of view, it was in 2006 that the Justicialist government of Néstor
Kirchner approved a moratorium measure on the pension system for citizens of retirement age,
paying the total remaining contributions in instalments. This measure would greatly increase
pension coverage, with future generations not being eligible (Pribble, 2013a). It was in 2008 that
Cristina Kirchner's first government published Law 26425, which completely eliminated private
pension systems, pooling their funds into a state-run system and making all pensioners eligible
for contributory and non-contributory systems (Arza, 2013). These reforms were almost always
accompanied by the hegemony of the PJ, reinforced by the unsustainability of the old pension
system, and the decline of the mixed system affected by the aftershocks of the crisis. At the same
time, the Kirchner government decreed universal child benefit for families in the informal
market, with the process of renationalizing the private pension system (Lo Vuolo, 2013).
The decline and unsustainability of the private systems reinforced the more statist nature
of the Justicialist government. The federalist and fragmented nature of the forms of social
protection, with consequences for coverage and access, also had a significant impact on this
decision, given that elections for state governments were to be held in 2009. The regional nature
of Argentinian politics is no less important, and was a relevant factor in the Jefes y Jefas program,
with clear consequences for the PJ's clientelist and hegemonic machine. At the same time, the
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loss of seats in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies during the mid-term elections reinforced
the need to extend non-contributory policies, due to greater electoral competition (Pribble,
2013b).
During the Menem governments, there was a profound regression of the health system
with the deregulation of the obras sociales program and the decentralization of hospital
administration. Despite attempts to reform it, opposition from the unions hindered the change
in funding, which would have consequences for the public health system, which began to treat
affiliated and privately insured patients (McGuire, 2011; Murillo, 2001). The transfer of hospitals
to regional administration established greater segmentation in the quality and supply of the
public system (Levitsky, 2003; Murillo, 2001; Pribble, 2013b).
In the Brazilian case, the idea of universalization in the provision of services and
resources played an important role in the process of democratic transition (Melo, 2014). This
debate was shaped by the failure of the policies of the 1980s. In the field of health, the Sarney
government (1985-1990) created the single decentralized health system, along with reforms to
cover the poorest population. Despite some incentives created over the course of almost two
decades, the SUS would continue to see non-continuous use, in parallel with private services and
alongside segmentation in the quality of services and especially unequal access (Gragnolati et al.,
2013; Melo, 2014). The governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002) and Lula da
Silva (2003-2010) significantly increased health spending, with the latter playing a crucial role in
funding primary care and family health units (Melo, 2014). As in Argentina, Brazil began a
process of decentralization, which highlighted the segmentation of responses. At the same time,
the Lula governments established public-private partnerships for hospital management (Melo,
2014).
Regarding pension funds, the Cardoso government initiated reforms to state benefits for
civil servants, while keeping private schemes intact. This parametric reform made it possible to
make the system more equitable by bringing civil servants and formal workers (Melo, 2014).
However, it would be the Lula governments and the first Rousseff government (2011-2014) that
would introduce ceilings on the public pension system, but also make the Public Servant Pension
Fund effective (Melo, 2014).
Table 8.
Party fragmentation, electoral volatility and majorities: Argentina and Brazil (1990-2015)
Fragmentatio
n
Volatility
Senate
majority
Lower house
majority
Argentina (1990-95)
3.35
13.2
1995 - Yes
1989 – No
1991 - No
1993 – No
1995 - Yes
Argentina (2010-15)
5.10
25.1 (2010)
2011 – Yes
2013 - Yes
2011 – Yes
2013 - Yes
Brazil (1990-95)
8.42
27.7
No
No
Brazil (2010-15)
11.79
18.2 (2010)
No
No
Sources: IFES – Election Guide, Dirección Nacional de Elecciones (Argentina) and Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
(Brazil). Roberts e Wibbels, 1999, Mainwaring, España e Gervasoni (2009), Concha, 2014.
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In this context, the debate on the sustainability of the pension system and the
segmentation of public and private protection systems would continue (Melo, 2014). Also, in the
field of social protection, the PT governments did not innovate in terms of coverage for
informal workers and non-contributory responses, proliferating conditional transfer program
such as Bolsa Família (Hunter, 2010; Lavinas, 2013). The first efforts to standardize these
responses were still observed in the 1990s, along with the expansion of their coverage in the face
of the growing informal market, as is the case with Bolsa Família (Arza, 2013; Campello and Neri,
2013; Mcguire, 2011).
As we have seen, the Argentine and Brazilian cases present greater political
fragmentation, with consequences for the formulation of public welfare policies. In the case of
the PJ, where a shift to the left is visible, pragmatism grants greater decentralization, along with a
greater focus on direct resource transfer policies, leaving the health and education sectors almost
untouched, where greater institutional fragmentation makes changes difficult. In the case of the
PT, where the influence of social movements and unions loses weight due to greater government
and legislative fragmentation, programmes such as Bolsa Família have reached the poverty pockets
more universally (Lavinas, 2013). The PT would gradually achieve a catch-all party structure with
hints of a cartel party, a path that the PJ had already taken since the 1990s. None of this would
be possible without the high political fragmentation that generates incentives for the continuous
negotiation of public policies, as well as generating fewer incentives for the reversal of the
institutional process, since the beneficiaries of the institutional process reinforce this same
framework. However, both present a framework of policy legacy, where the institutional reaction
occurred in a moderate manner, with a full integration of the continuity of policies from the
1990s, this time in a pragmatic and tendentially inclusive manner in the face of greater political
fragmentation.
COLOMBIA AND MEXICO: THE PRODUCTIVIST CONTRAST
In addition to the reduced party fragmentation in the early 1990s, Colombian pension
and health systems underwent a profound process of decentralization and segmentation of their
responses and forms of administration (Mesa-Lago, 2012). In this sense, it seems to us that this
party fragmentation is an important factor in the definition of public policies, not because of its
greater dispersion in the political-party struggle, but especially because it is part of the continuity
of the hegemony of the centrist political vision in the management of the welfare regime.
Colombia has decentralized its services more effectively, along with complementary and
competitive private services. This decentralization corresponds to the establishment of municipal
governments during the Gaviria government (1990-1994), along with the structural reforms
proposed by international organizations and implemented during the 1990s. In the health sector,
decentralization was more pronounced, with municipalities gaining responsibility for the
administration of primary care and preventive medicine (Cruz-Saco, 2002; Mesa-Lago, 2012).
The Gaviria government also began a reform of the social security system in 1993,
separating the pension system from the health system (Cruz-Saco, 2002). Still in the area of
pensions, Colombia would establish two parallel selective systems, with the formal worker
choosing which system to choose. However, these reforms did not significantly change the levels
of coverage, since the share of the informal workforce gradually increased between the 1990s
and 2000s (Cruz-Saco, 2002). This first reform would completely transform the system by
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establishing a competitive private sector, with a clear majority of the Liberal Party in the
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. This reform would maintain the various protection
schemes for civil servants and oil sector workers (Mesa-Lago, 2012). The same happened in 2002
during the second reform of the system, this time with the introduction of new civil servants and
oil sector workers into the general system, and changing the pension schemes for teachers,
military personnel and former presidents (Mesa-Lago, 2012). At the same time, and as
Mesa-Lago (2012) considers, the incentives to remain in the public sector would eventually
diminish from 2003 onwards, since the private sector would produce greater income for
beneficiaries. The third reform attempt in 2006 sought to end the public system altogether.
However, the greater fragmentation in the legislature would prevent this reform, followed by the
institutionalization of a publicly-traded system, Colpensiones.
In the health sector, decentralization reached its zenith, with a multiplicity of forms of
response, between national, regional and municipal public models and, in the private sector, with
the segmentation of forms of protection between civil servants, military personnel, teachers and
other sectors (Mesa-Lago, 2012).
Also relevant in the Colombian case are the profound inequality in income distribution
and the ongoing military conflict (Draibe and Riesco, 2007). The war climate became a
structuring factor in the welfare regime. This is demonstrated by the Familias en Acción and Agro
Ingreso Seguro programmes, which provide conditional income transfers and access to credit, and
incorporate the agricultural sector, with a clear productivism vision.
In the face of President Uribe's neo-populist stance, the presidency of Juan Manuel
Santos (2010-2018) demonstrated a greater capacity for dialogue and openness, in a more
fragmented political scenario (de la Roche, 2015). President Santos' pragmatic vision led to the
Rural Development with Equity program. This program aimed to support the agroexport sector
in light of the design of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, demonstrating a clear
productivism commitment by the regime (De la Roche, 2015).
In Mexico, the model of integration through privileged trade relations with the United
States, which defines the productivism scheme of its regime, would be maintained
(Brachet-Márquez, 2004; Franzoni, 2007). Despite the lower party fragmentation, Mexico also
proceeded to decentralize and segment its health and social protection systems. The continuity of
the Mexican regime is also due to the element of segmentation and stratification. The system
maintained specific schemes for different corporate sectors, and in the public sector, several
parallel schemes would remain (Mesa-Lago, 2008, 2012; Murillo, 2001). Resisting changes to the
pension system, Mexico would be one of the last to continue with its replacement reform
(Mesa-Lago, 2012). This occurred in a climate of systemic collapse, demonstrating the
importance that stratification and segmentation represented for the PRI’s own political and
governmental structure, along with the party’s liberal shift in the 1980s and 1990s. This reform,
initiated during the Zedillo government (1994-2000) with broad majority support in the
legislature, would establish an individual capitalization regime with private administration of
certain plans and state supervision. As in Colombia, the coverage of this system showed only
marginal changes of around 30% (Cruz-Saco, 2002).
Table 9.
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Party fragmentation, electoral volatility and majorities: Colombia e Mexico (1990-2015)
Fragmentatio
n
Volatility
Senate
majority
Lower house
majority
Colombia (1990-95)
2.45
10.2
1990 – Yes
1994 - Yes
1990 – Yes
1994 – Yes
Colombia (2010-15)
5.32
15.9 (2010)
2010 – No
2014 - No
2010 – No
2014 - No
Mexico (1990-95)
2.66
14.8
1991 – Yes
1994 - Yes
1991 – Yes
1994 – Yes
Mexico (2010-15)
3.19
21.0 (2010)
2012 – No
2015 – No
2012 – No
2015 - No
Sources: Registraduría Nacional (Colombia) and Instituto Nacional Electoral (Mexico). Roberts e Wibbels,
1999, Mainwaring, España e Gervasoni (2009), Concha, 2014.
As in Colombia, the Mexican health system maintained a degree of segmentation
between formal, self-employed and informal workers, with very limited coverage for the latter
two (Mesa-Lago, 2012). In health, a decentralized system followed, with the public sector fixed
for workers without a contract, alongside private schemes for formal workers, a specialized
family insurance for rural workers and specific schemes for public employees of the central
administration, and others for employees of regional and local administrations (Mesa-Lago, 2012;
Murillo, 2001). These reforms would be initiated by the Gortari government (1988-1994), after
the most contested elections to date, resulting from some splits in the PRI elites (Greene, 2007;
Murillo, 2001). The victory of Vicente Fox (2000-2006) marked the introduction of democratic
alternation and the establishment of a bipolar system, along with a deep economic crisis during
the Zedillo government (1994-2000). President Calderón (2006-2012) reformed PRONASOL by
creating the Oportunidades program with a multidisciplinary view of poverty, with incentives for
education, access to health care and food, along with the food support program to support
families in accessing basic food baskets (Levy and Schady, 2013).
As Haggard and Kaufman (1995) point out, catch-all and cartel parties are better
equipped to manage the structural adjustments imposed by the international economy, as in
Argentina, Colombia or Mexico. Colombia and Mexico did not experience military dictatorships,
which did not prevent traditional parties from managing the crisis and obtaining electoral gains
for a certain period (Greene, 2007). At the same time, it is also from the traditional parties of
these party systems that greater electoral competition has been generated.
While in the Colombian case, the traditional bipolar system gives rise to greater
political-institutional fragmentation, in Mexico we also observe a lower capacity for institutional
reaction and greater levels of adaptation, without, however, this adaptation occurring first
through the political hegemony of the PRI, and second through the continuity of policies even
after the break of this hegemony (Greene, 2007).
In Colombia, the liberal matrix of the welfare regime is maintained, although
fragmentation occurs especially within the elites of the liberal and conservative parties. The
Colombian regime assumes itself in this political scenario, with a productivism tone, more
focused on competition, but with lower results than Chile, due to the massification of the
informal workforce and the lower redistributive capacity.
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The particularist, clientelist and corporatist aspects were clearly shaped by the format of
the political system. The state of war in Colombia and the political hegemony of the PRI would
continue to define social welfare schemes, with less political-institutional fragmentation and a
residual presence of the institutional left. Multi-challenged poverty and the exponential growth of
informal work, combined with the productivism vision of the State, profoundly mark these
welfare regimes.
BOLIVIA AND VENEZUELA: THE FAMILY-PROTECTIONIST EVOLUTION
Compared to the 1990s, Bolivia began to stand out in terms of tax effort and social
investment in the social protection and education sectors, compared to other countries with low
GDP per capita (Cecchini et al., 2014). In 1996, the country began its process of reforming its
social security system (Cruz-Saco, 2002). As would happen in Colombia and Mexico, this reform
would end up separating health from the contributory pension system. However, the Bolivian
social security reform would follow a model identical to that of Chile, with the total replacement
of the public pension system by a private system, with the State maintaining minimum pensions
and primary health care. Bolivia would be the only country to universalize its pension system,
including military and police personnel in the new general system, as well as to establish the
Bonosol for non-contributory social pensions (Filgueira, 2005; Mesa-Lago, 2012; Mcguire, 2011).
With support from the World Bank, the first social emergency fund in Latin America was
launched in 1987, which later gave way to microcredit schemes and social investment funds
(Mcguire, 2011). However, its scope was limited (Mcguire, 2011). It would be in 1996, with the
creation of the Bonosol, a program established as compensation for the privatization of public
companies, that Bolivia achieved, twenty years later, a non-contributory coverage well above the
Latin American average (Mesa-Lago, 2012; Mcguire, 2011; Rofman, 2005).
The reforms in the health sector would follow the reforms in the social security system
initiated by the Sanchéz de Losada government, with little or residual integration of the different
coverage schemes, with less decentralization and small population coverage (Mesa-Lago, 2012).
Due to its “family” nature, the system would end up including a greater concern for families with
dependent parents and siblings (Mesa-Lago, 2012). In Bolivia, the structural reforms met with an
institutional reaction with the election of President Evo Morales of the MAS. Contrary to the
cases of Argentina, Mexico and Colombia, where institutional continuity was generated from
political splits within the traditional party elite that managed the liberalization process, in Bolivia
the reaction occurred through the gradual fragmentation and erosion of the competitive
structure of the party system. The Morales governments (2006-2019) managed to increase
pension coverage, especially through the Bonosol reform (Arza, 2013). With the renationalization
of the hydrocarbons sector, his first government not only increased coverage but also benefits
through the Renta Dignidad, lowering the eligibility age and granting two types of subsidies: one
for non-contributory pensioners and the other, of a supplementary nature (Arza, 2013).
Through the new constitution, Bolivia institutionalized the Unified Health System, a
tripartite system between the public sector, the private sector and the social security system,
increasing public spending and focusing on primary care.
Breaking the punto fijo political system, Hugo Chávez won the 1998 presidential elections
(Mainwaring, 2012). As in Bolivia, the political and institutional reaction came from the left, since
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the previous political party system did not generate continuity in policies due to the intra-elite
fragmentation of traditional parties. In 1988, Venezuelan social security covered only 35% of the
total working population. However, Venezuela maintained its public system, amid a complex
implementation of structural reforms, greater political fragmentation and the multiplication of
social protests (Mesa-Lago, 2012). A new attempt at reform took place at the end of Caldera's
term (1994-1999), in line with the Venezuela Agenda negotiated with the IMF. The Asian crisis
of 1997 and the first Chavista government suspended the reform, pointing to the integration of
all schemes into a general scheme, excluding the military (Mesa-Lago, 2012; Pribble, 2013).
Table 10.
Party fragmentation, electoral volatility and majorities: Bolivia and Venezuela (1990-2015)
Fragmentatio
n
Volatility
Senate
majority
Lower house
majority
Bolivia (1990-95)
3.81
27.6
1989 – No
1993 - Yes
1989 – No
1993 - No
Bolivia (2010-15)
1.88
35.9 (2009)
2009 – Yes
2013 - Yes
2009 – Yes
2013 - Yes
Venezuela (1990-95)
3.51
20.9
1988 - No
1993 - No
1988 - No
1993 - No
Venezuela (2010-15)
1.88
34.5 (2010)
-
2010 - Yes
2015 - No
Sources: Tribunal Supremo Electoral (Bolivia) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (Venezuela). Roberts e Wibbels,
1999, Mainwaring, España e Gervasoni (2009), Concha, 2014.
In 2003, the government launched the Misiones Bolivarianas, in the context of the
pre-campaign for the regional elections. It is important to highlight that despite the victory of the
Chavista coalition in the 1998 presidential elections, there was a fragmentation of parties in the
Venezuelan parliament, making it even more urgent to ensure hegemony in the political system
(Pribble, 2013). The first program launched by Chávez was the Misión Mercal (2003), with
supermarkets financed by the State to provide access to basic goods at affordable prices (D’Elia
and Queiroz 2010). Another program that follows the central role of the President is the welfare
program Madres del Barrio Adentro, with conditional income transfers and support in situations of
extreme poverty (Pribble, 2013). Also in 2007, and also as a presidential initiative, the decree
extending pensions to women who reach retirement age was issued. In Venezuela, these
segmented policies correspond to the family and community structure of the welfare regime. As
Pribble (2013) concludes, Chávez would establish up to nine social policy programmes, none of
which would achieve a universal character. It is also important to highlight that these purely
presidential policies were initiated after the resounding victory in the 2004 gubernatorial
elections and after two consecutive majorities in the Chamber of Deputies.
In health, there is still a low degree of integration between the public, private and social
security systems, with lower coverage than in other cases (Mesa-Lago, 2012). Segmentation is
also visible, with the richest regions obtaining the best medical infrastructures (Mesa-Lago,
2012).
While Venezuela deepens the continuity of its institutional scheme, indicating specific
programmes that especially support the “Family” axis and community structures, Bolivia
presents less segmentation, with programmes that tend to universalize access. In both cases, the
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legacy of policies had much less influence on the consolidation of their welfare regimes. On the
one hand, this can be explained by the charismatic leadership of the two leaders, as seen in Evo
Morales’ Renta Dignidad initiative or in the presidential decrees of the Chavista missions (Pribble,
2013). On the other hand, the reduced party fragmentation, together with the establishment of a
new bipolarization, also allowed the institutional role of the State to change. Finally, the greatest
innovation in these countries is related to the deep financial interconnection between the export
sectors and redistribution, guaranteed in periods of international expansion. In these cases,
indirect social support guaranteed through price controls in the energy sector is of vital
importance (Levy & Schady, 2013).
Discussion
What characterizes the social welfare system in Latin America? First of all, the
informality-formality axis. Greater informality in the labor market will represent a regime with
greater insecurity and dependence on family and community relations, where clientele
phenomena, female unemployment and social conflicts play a relevant role (Cantu, 2015; Cortés,
2008; Gough, 2004, 2013; Gough and Wood, 2004; Rudra, 2005). These regimes will also be
those where the market and the State were belatedly incorporated into a formal scheme of
protection and incentive for certain professional sectors (Mesa-Lago, 1994, 2012), becoming
exclusionary due to the structural inability to redistribute (Filgueira, 1998, 2004), but also
family-based (Cortés, 2008; Franzoni, 2007, 2009). In this group we can include as examples the
cases of Venezuela and Bolivia, among the informal-secure/insecure regimes (Gough, 2004;
Gough, 2013; Gough and Wood, 2004).
Greater formality in the labor determines that the regimes as either state-protectionist or
state-productivist (Franzoni, 2007, 2009); however, stratification through greater protection of
certain sectors and professional groups, produces greater dependence on the market – in sectors
dependent on international insertion – or on the State. These cases are also those where the State
initiated social policies earlier (Mesa-Lago, 1994, 2012) and where the conflict is established
between the adoption of policies of a productivist or protectionist nature, with Chile assuming
itself as paradigmatic of the first and Uruguay of the second. It is along the
protectionist-productivist axis that Latin American cases have moved since the 2000s with the
rise of protectionist policies, namely in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Venezuela, in contrast to
the productivist policies implemented in the 1980s and 1990s.
Finally, political fragmentation appears as the index capable of establishing a rupture in
social welfare regimes, altering their protectionist or productivist nature, as is the case in
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Venezuela.
Figure 1.
Welfare regimes in Latin America: informal-formal and productivist-protecionist axes
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Concluding remarks
Latin American welfare regimes hang on a balance between more advanced welfare states
and developmental contexts. In this case, there is no room to undertake an effortless attempt at
conceptualizing a “Latin America Welfare State”. Latin America is characterized by
fragmentation and divergence; on one hand, fragmentation categorized by historical and political
institutional contexts, on the other hand divergence between ideological projects and public
policy.
The vulnerabilities observed during the period of democratization are in line with the
process of liberalization and the progressive growth of the informal workforce (Abel & Lewis,
2002). Informality began to have a significant impact not only in cases where it already occupied
a large part of the workforce, such as in Bolivia, Colombia and Mexico, but also in cases where it
saw exponential growth during the 1990s and 2000s, such as in Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela.
Specifically, the harmful effects of the crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s can be observed in
Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico. While in the Argentine case, we observe an approximation to a
regime of statist content, as is the case in Brazil, in the Mexican and Chilean cases, we observe
the continuity of their productivist regime. Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina, on the other hand,
reinforced the protectionist tendency of their regimes. At the beginning of the 2000s, we observe
a gradual reduction in poverty, with the exception of Argentina and Uruguay, which returned to
levels close to those of the early 1990s.
As pointed out, the disparities between Latin American regimes are due to different
welfare mixes, but also to different levels of investment and results. To a lesser extent than in
“familiar” regimes, others with productivist or protectionist characteristics have high proportions
of the active population inserted in the informal labor market, which, in parallel with the
liberalization of the welfare scheme, characterizes all Latin American regimes emerging from the
2000s. This cross-cutting characteristic determines the greater propensity for the development of
welfare policies. While in protectionist and productivist regimes, individuals are able to obtain
greater support from the labor market and/or the State, in familiar regimes the multiplication of
family and community strategies that allow access to informal goods and services prevails as we
see in the Venezuelan public policy strategies.
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In the timid process of universalization of social policies and programmes, the focus
would remain on initiatives to combat poverty, especially understood as a structural element
where it comes to access to social protection, health and education. Structural poverty would not
be fully absorbed during the periods of economic growth of the 1990s and 2000s, accompanied
by the hegemony of the informal and seasonal labor market and the reduced organization of
workers due to the loss of formal ties. It is in this context that grew the interest in implementing
responses to combat poverty, motivated and sponsored by international organizations; however,
there was a growing appetite for highly segmented programmes, both in terms of target
audiences and in the content of the response, alongside the processes of unification of social
security systems and the segmentation and decentralization of the health and education sectors
initiated in the 1990s. The “new” social policies of the Latin American 21
st
century would include
conditional income transfer programmes, literacy child and maternal support, as ways to
overcome the social inefficiencies of the 1990s.
In other words, while we observe the emergence of “social emergency” policies to fight
poverty creating fragmented responses, there continues to subsist a clear segmentation of social
security systems through the protection of certain social classes (coming from the 1960s) and/or
economic sectors integrated in the international economic strategy of each state.
In parallel, there is the continuity of the agroexport structure and the dependence on the
fluctuation of commodity prices on the international market. In the case of welfare regimes,
much of the social protection would be maintained for a set of professional sectors between the
1970s and 1990s - stratification; comparatively, the weak incorporation of the informal sector of
the labor market in social protection policies would remain throughout the 2000s and 2010s. In
this milieu, the different Latin American social welfare regimes present a response to the
problems posed international insertion strategies, that is, they included both a vision of
interaction/substitution via the State (protectionist), or a focus on the privatization of resources
and protecting certain economic sectors (productivist).
The intertwining between segmentation, on one hand, and fragmentation on the other
hand is relevant because (1) they refer to the fact that social policies initiated in 1940/1950
continued to have relevant weight until the mid-1990s; (2) the professional groups and classes
that, broadly speaking, benefited from these policies, especially social security systems, continued
to enjoy them during retirement periods between the 1960s and 1980s; and (3) the changes
brought by the establishment of “new” social policies in the first half of the 2010s did not alter
the region's welfare scheme. In response, social policies in Latin America either constitute a
strategy to protect or enlarge segmented past policies in a clear path-dependent model; or
constitute a strategy to counter socioeconomic or professional classes that are seen as privileged.
In conclusion, Latin American social welfare regimes present themselves as a clear
reaction to the problems posed by political and social conflicts generated by international
economic insertion models. In this case, they followed one another in an institutional reaction
either against the protectionist initiative or against the market via the protection of certain
economic sectors. As there is not a universalizing tendency of public policies, Latin American
social regimes are highly dependent on political cycles, which generates segmented political
initiatives, reinforcing stratification strategies.
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Vol. III, núm. I, pp. 95 - 120
APENDIX
Indicators, 1990-1995 and 2010-2015
119
IPW
LS
PSAgg (%)
Pens (%)
Stud (%)
HospB
PrivSS
PrivHlth
90-9
5
10-1
5
90-9
5
10-1
5
90-9
5
10-1
5
90-9
5
10-1
5
90-95
10-15
90-9
5
10-1
5
Argentina
9.26
11.6
3
70
90.7
83.4
95.4
6
4.60
4.72
2
1
76
35.6
Bolivia
6.5
11.2
6
80.7
90.5
45.3
93.5
1.38
1.10
5
4
40
35
Brazil
11.5
15.1
3
83.7
86.3
70.3
96.1
1
3.42
2.30
1
1
57.8
55.7
Chile
11.5
8
14.2
5
63
74.4
9
78.7
99.0
2
3.13
2.13
5
4
46.4
40.1
Colombia
3.5
11.8
1
13.8
22.9
7
54.2
84.3
1
1.33
1.48
4
3
21.8
30.9
Mexico
4.9
8.05
10.0
3
25.2
1
71.6
94.8
3
1.15
1.56
3
3
58.3
48.4
Uruguay
8.96
13.1
5
62
68.1
7
92.3
99.1
6
4.47
2.40
2
2
54.4
32.8
Venezuel
a
8
14.0
2
40.5
50.1
85.7
91.1
6
2.63
0.85
1
1
59.1
54.6
LS (cont.)
VMI
FRAG
PrivEduc
(%)
EL (%)
Pov (%)
InfW (%)
VulEmp (%)
ConstStr
90-9
5
10-1
5
90-9
5
10-1
5
90-9
5
10-1
5
90-9
5
10-1
5
90-95
10-15
90-9
5
10-1
5
Argentina
20.5
2
24.9
4
68
55.0
1
19.5
6
21.8
49.7
24.73
19.52
5
5
Bolivia
8
24.9
3
56.8
48.7
75.6
29.7
65.6
75.1
67.45
61.58
3
5
Brazil
8.5
15.7
8
51.4
56.8
3
57.9
17.7
37.8
42.2
33.25
26.83
7
7
Chile
41.9
4
60.2
9
71.2
78.2
51
10.5
18.2
25.6
27.95
21.47
2
4
Colombia
16.9
6
18.7
2
64.5
68.9
1
72.7
29.8
35.1
59.6
47.71
47.77
2
4
Mexico
6.26
8.48
63.1
66.9
3
48.2
51.3
27.1
53.7
38.32
28.38
4
4
Uruguay
16.3
17.1
3
62.5
69.5
21.3
5.2
35.2
39.8
23.59
22.83
2
3
Venezuel
a
15.0
1
18.0
7
59.8
36.5
8
51.7
41.9
30.8
47.5
31.75
32.64
6
4
FRAG (cont.)
LFT
PartFrag
LFTGov (%)
LFTParl (%)
UDens
90-95
10-15
90-95
10-15
90-95
10-15
90-95
10-15
Argentina
3.35
5.1
12.5
45
36.5
68.5
22.3
30
Bolivia
3.81
1.88
0
100
19.5
81.9
8.7
39.1
Brazil
8.42
11.79
16.66
36.66
22.4
37.5
23.8
17.4
Chile
1.99
2.13
66.55
42.85
54.5
50
16.2
16.56
Colombia
2.45
5.32
0
12.5
1.2
6.1
12.1
9.66
Mexico
2.66
3.19
0
0
15.6
25.8
25.6
13.68
Uruguay
3.33
2.65
0
100
32.3
52.5
16.3
29.05
Venezuela
3.51
1.88
12.5
100
32.5
67.8
13.5
0.2
Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales |
Vol. III, núm. I, pp. 95 - 120
Labels:
PSAgg – Public spending by functions (government);
Pens - Proportion of persons above retirement age receiving a pension (%);
Stud - Pupils starting grade 1 and reaching the last grade of primary school (%)
HospB - Hospital beds (per 10 000 population);
PrivSS – Private social security systems;
PrivHlth - Private expenditure on health as a percentage of total expenditure on health;
PrivEduc - Private schools enrolment (%);
EL - Economic liberalisation;
Pov - Poor and extreme poor (% of population);
InfW - Informal sector as a percentage of total workforce;
VulEmp - Vulnerable population in the labor market (%);
ConstStr – Constitutional structure;
PartFrag – Party fragmentation;
LFTGov – Left in government;
LFTParl – Left in parliament;
UDens – Union density.
Sources: Private health (PrivHlth) calculated as a percentage of total private national spending on health by the total
spending on health (Author, ECLAC, WHO).
Private social security calculated on a scale from 1 to 5 (where 5 corresponds to total privatization) for the first set of
data (1990-1995), and calculated on a scale from 1 to 4 for the second set of data (2010-2015) (De la Torre e
Rudolph, 2018; Filgueira, 1998, 2005; Kritzer, 2000; Mesa-Lago, 2014; Rofman, 2005).
Constitutional structure (ConstStr): Lijphart (1984), taking into account the qualitative data found on Huber, Ragin
& Stephens (1993), and Cheibub, Elkins & Ginsburg (2011).
Party fragmentation (PartFrag) from data obtained by Gallagher & Mitchell (2005) and the author from various
electoral data for the lower house of Parliament: Argentina (1989, 1991, 1993, 1995/2009, 2011, 2013, 2013), Bolivia
(1989, 1993/2009, 2014), Brazil (1994/2010, 2014), Chile (1989, 1993/2009, 2013), Colombia (1990, 1994/2010,
2014), Mexico (1991, 1994/2012, 2015), Uruguay (1994/2009, 2014), and Venezuela (1993/2010, 2015).
Left in government (LFTGov): data from presidential elections, taking into account governmental coalitions with
leftist parties: Argentina (1989, 1995/2011, 2015), Bolivia (1989, 1993/2009, 2014), Brazil (1989, 1994/2010, 2014),
Chile (1989, 1993/2009, 2013), Colombia (1990, 1994/2010, 2014), Mexico (1991, 1994/2012, 2018), Uruguay
(1989, 1994/2009, 2014), and Venezuela (1988, 1993/2012).
120